Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

1977

Workers' Health and Safety: Whose Costs, Whose Benefits?
Joseph A. Page
Georgetown University Law Center, page@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1153

55 Tex. L. Rev. 359-369 (1977) (reviewing Nicholas A. Ashford, Crisis in the Workplace:
Occupational Disease and Injury (1976))
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Health Policy Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Other Public Affairs, Public
Policy and Public Administration Commons

Book Review
Workers' Health and Safety: Whose Costs,
Whose Benefits?
By Joseph A. Page*
By
Nicholas A. Ashford. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976. Pp. xii, 588.
$16.95.

CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE: OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND INJURY.

Health and safety on the job remain sources of bitter controversy in the
public forums. Businessmen rail against the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) for its "dictatorial" enforcement of "oppressive"
regulations, 1 leading President Ford in early 1976 to demonstrate sympathy
for their concems. 2 Labor leaders deplore the failure of industry and government to stem the toll of death and disablement from work-related disease. 3
Members of' Congress, responsive to pressures from constituents, fill pages of
the Congressional Record with reports of both employer vexations4 and
employee tragedies. 5
Like ships passing in the night, advocates on both sides tend to regard
one another at a distance and seldom join issues in rational debate. Industry

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. 1955, LL.B. 1958, LL.M.
1964, Harvard University. The author wishes to thank Kathleen A. Blackburn, class of 1977,
Georgetown University Law Center, for her assistance.
1. For a representative sampling of complaints about OSHA, see Hearings on Occupational Safety and Health Act Review Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Hearings on Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (Oversight and Proposed Amendments) Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings].
2. See Burnham, Agency Assailed by Ford Defers New Safety Rules Till After Election,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1976, at 15, col. 1. In contrast, the Carter administration initially appears
more attuned to labor's concerns for job safety. See [1976] OccUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP.
(BNA) 947.
3. See, e.g., Bishop, AFL-CIO Aide Charges Delay in Reports on Exposure to CancerCausing Agents, Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1976, at 6, col. 2.
4. See, e.g., 122 CoNG. REc. S8670-71 (daily ed. June 8, 1976); id. at S5621-22 (daily ed.
Apr. 13, 1976); id. at E2332 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1976).
5. See, e.g., 122CONG. REC.E3226-27(dailyed.June9, 1976); id.atE1795(dailyed.Apr.2,
1976); id. at E1710-11 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1976).
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harps on the bewildering multiplicity of OSHA standards, many of them
trivial or vague. 6 Some authors have deemed the ne~ms between standards and
safety dubious 7 and have further maintained that standards impose costs far in
excess of any benefits they may bring. 8 Small businesses feel at a particular
disadvantage since they find it burdensome both to learn)Vhat the law requires
of them and to fulfill their legal obligations. 9 Labor, on the other hand, prefers
to ·stress the menace of occupational disease. The silent violence inflicted
upon workers by toxic substances gives no sign of abating. Indeed, recent
reports indicate that the current knowledge of health hazards on the job signals
but the tip of a deadly iceberg. 10 Although Congress designed the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 11 in large measure to protect employees from
these very risks, 12 agency development of OSHA standards restricting
exposures to harmful chemicals, dusts, and stresses has proceeded at an
agonizingly slow pace. 13
Instinctively, one would expect that efforts to save the lives of workers
threatened by industrial disease would command a higher priority than
measures to trim back excesses visited by OSHA upon employers in the name
of safety regulation. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be the case.
Managerial irritation at OSHA, coupled with the general concern over the
costs and inflationary impact of health and safety standards, has helped fuel a

6. The industry position is aptly stated in testimony by Rep. Richard White in House
Hearings, supra note 1, at 3-10, 17.
7. See R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT: ITS GOALS AND ITS
ACHIEVEMENTS 59-71 (1976).
.
8. See M. WEIDENBAUM, GOVERNMENT-MANDATED PRICE INCREASES: A NEGLECTED AsPECT OF INFLATION 43-55 (1975).
9. See generally Hearings on Small Business and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of

1970 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Problems Affecting Small Business of the House
Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); see also Jett, New Job-Safety Rules
Perplex the Owners of Small Businesses; Needless Costs Cited, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1973, at 42,
col. L
10. For recent disclosures of job health hazards, see [1976] OccuPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP.
(BNA) 884-85 (pesticide poisoning); Auerbach, Cancer Probed at Plant, Wash. Post, May 28,
1976, at A-15, col. 1; Auerbach, Leukemia in Rubber Factories Probed, Wash. Post, May 1, 1976,
atA-3, col. 2; Weinstein, A Battery Plant and Lead Poisoning, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1976,atF-1,
col. 6. See generally J. STELLMAN & S. DAUM, WORK Is DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH (1973).
1 L 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
12. See id. §§ 651(b)(6)-(7). See also id. §§ 669,671. Foradiscussionofthebackgroundofthe
Act, with references to the significance of occupational health concerns as catalysts for its
passage, see J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, BITTER WAGES 47-189 (1973).
13. See Page & Munsing, Occupational Health and the Federal Government: The Wages Are
Still Bitter, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PRos. 651, 655-57 (1974). See also Hearings on Departments of

Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations for 1977 Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at567-74, 581-83 (1976) (testimony
of Morton Corn, Asst. Sec. of Labor for OSHA) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Appropriation
Hearings]; HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, CHEMICAL DANGERS IN THE WORKPLACE, H.R. REP. No. 94-1688, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).

360

OSHA
broad congressional backlash against federal regulation. 14 The reaction has
spawned bills authorizing congressional power to veto agency rules 15 and to
initiate programs for regulatory reform. 16 Meanwhile, industry has been
vigorously opposing OSHA health standards on the ground inter alia of
economic infeasibility Y The reaction has placed labor very much on the
defensive, struggling to preserve the Act against amendments that it perceives
as crippling 18 and to oppose an alleged overemphasis on costs in the
standard-setting process. 19 Consequently, labor organizations have not been
able to mount an all-out affirmative effort to reduce health hazards to workers.
The time is therefore propitious for a fresh analysis of the core issues that
give rise to the current disagreements over occupational health and safety.
Crisis in the Workplace presents itself as such an endeavor. The fruits of a
two-year study supported by the Ford Foundation, the book attempts to
explore in a definitive, dispassionate manner the technical, legal, political,
and economic aspects of safety and health regulation for the workplace. Its
author, lawyer-economist Nicholas A. Ashford, sets his work apart from the
horror story genre into which many prior books on the subject fall 20-a
worthy goal since a clear and pressing need exists for the development of
policy and strategy options.
Crisis offers an incredible wealth of detail in its survey of the dimensions
of the problem and the various responses by the public and private sectors. It
also catalogues an array of options for reform. The book's major weakness
derives from the sin of overextension, which raises the suspicion that too
much of the book is an attenuated rehash of previously published material. In
addition, Dr. Ashford often fails to meet the challenge posed by the time lag
inherent in the publication of a study of this size-that of maintaining
relevance and utility in the face of subsequently unfolding events. Part of the
book emerges as far superior to the rest: the materials on the economics of
14. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. S2773-77 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1976); id. E869-74 (daily ed. Feb.
26, 1976); id. E12-13 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1976). But see (1976) 0CCUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP.
(BNA) 885 (House subcommittee demands greater mine safety).
15. E.g., H.R. 12048, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 1014, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1 (1976). On Sept. 21, 1976, the House passed H.R. 12048 by a 265-135 vote. 122
CONG. REC. H10,718 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976). For a reference to OSHA as providing a major
impetus for the bill, see Hearings on Congressional Review of Administrative Rulemaking Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 30, at 481 (1975).
16. E.g., S. 3428, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 2812, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
17. See Page & Munsing, supra note 13, at 663 & n.105; Rotman, Vinyl Chloride Costs on
Safety Seen High, Wash. Post,June28, 1974,atA-26, col. 1;Wai1St.J., Aug. 7, 1975, at2, col. 3.
18. See Sheehan, Let's Face It: Congress is Anti-OSHA, 4 INT'L UNION DEPT. OF THE
AFL-CIO; SPOTL1GHTON HEALTH & SAFETY 1 (No.4, 1975).
19. See, e.g., Richards, Steel Union Raps Coke Oven Rules, Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 1975, at
C-1, col. 1.
20. SeeDembart, HealthProblemsTracedtoJobs,N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1976,at23,col. 1.
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occupational health and safety shed invaluable light upon the uses and abuses
of cost-benefit analysis (pp. 308-423). They present insights into complexities that current criticism of OSHA tends to ignore and, as a welcome bonus,
offer discussion comprehensible to the noneconomist, a rare quality for
interdisciplinary writing in law and economics. Indeed, one leaves this
portion of the book with a thirst for more and a regret that the project did not
confine itself to this jugular issue. The strengths and weaknesses of Crisis
merit elaboration, first, by focusing on the book's treatment of the performance of the federal government concerning health and safety on the job and,
second, by examining Ashford's contributions to the evaluation of costs.
The 1970 Act gave the federal government for the first time a dominant
role in the struggle against industrial accidents and diseases. 21 OSHA, within
the Department of Labor, was assigned responsibility for the promulgation
and enforcement of safety and health standards, 22 the latter regulations
evolving from recommendations of the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH). 23 Whenever an employer contests a citation
issu.ed by OSHA while acting in its capacity as enforcer, the independent
Occupational Safety and Heath Review Commission (OSHRC) adjudicates
the case. 24 The United States courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review
both OSHA standards25 and decisions of the OSHRC. 26 The Congress
appropriates funds for the administration and enforcement of the Act,
oversees the work of the various agencies involved, confirms the President's
high-level appointments to OSHA and the Review Commission, and considers proposed amendments to the Act (pp. 141-50). Thus, an assessment ofthe
Government's performance requires a hard look at the judicial, legislative,
political, and administrative processes and their interaction.
Crisis provides a summary of administrative and judicial interpretations
of the Act during the first three years of its existence. The major disappointments in this section, apart from a lack of clarity on some minor matters, 27
stem from a failure to pursue the implications of several significant points
21. For a history of the federal role, see J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 12, at 167-90.
22. 29 u.s.c. §§ 655, 658 (1970).
23. Id. §§ 669(a)(2), 671.
24. Id. §§ 659(c), 661.
25. Id. § 655(f).
26. Id. §§ 660(a)-(b).
27. For example, in comparing the quantum of proof required for scientific conclusions with
that deemed necessary for legal decisionmaking, Ashford makes the following dubious assertion:
"When it comes to safe-guarding rights generally under the law, a 'scintilla of evidence' may
justify legal sanctions, control, and even the establishment of liability" (pp. 41-42). Without
attempting to explain the discrepancy, he records in successive paragraphs that the Act provides
that existing federal standards come into effect automatically on the effective date of the law and
that OSHA utilized a different section of the Act to promulgate these same existing federal
standards some time later (p. 153).
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raised and to lead the discussion of the developing case law beyond the
horizontal digest level. For example, Ashford observes that employers have
challenged the constitutionality of the Act, but does not delve past a mere
recitation of the various grounds asserted (p. 167). The Supreme Court may
soon decide whether the assessment of OSHA penalties without opportunity
for a jury trial violates the Constitution, 28 and a ruling against the Government
would seriously jeopardize the enforcement of the Act. Indeed, one federal
district court has declared the OSHA inspection provision unconstitutional as
a violation of fourth amendment limits on government searches. 29 The book
contributes nothing to an understanding of the issues or of the potential
significance of the case.
Ashford suggests that the promulgation of health standards that do not
provide special protection for pregnant women workers may violate Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act30 and the Constitution (p. 168). His anticipation of the
potential legal problem is praiseworthy, particularly since recent disclosures
have called attention to the special hazards that may endanger both working
women and their future children. 31 Despite his prognosis he does not go
further to consider the very live problem of whether, in the abs~nce of an
OSHA standard dealing with this particular risk, an employer may legally
limit the work assigned to women generally or women of childbearing age, or
even refuse to hire them. 32
The legal material contributes little to the goals of the book. It remains
too skimpy to serve as a mini-hornbook, 33 and merely catalogues unresolved
legal issues without any attempt at analysis (pp. 181-82). Crisis offers little

28. Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1200
(3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1458 (1976); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1458 (1976).
29. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976), stay granted sub nom.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 776 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.). For other negative judicial
reactions, both state and federal, see the list of cases in [19761 OCCUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP.
(BNA) 948-49.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
31. See 1977 Appropriation Hearings, supra note 13, at 846 (testimony ofDavidJ. Sencer,
Director, Center for Disease Control). See also [1975] 0CCUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA)
980; Burham, Rise in Birth Defects Laid to Job Hazards, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1976, at 1,co1.2.
Recently the Court has indicated a curious lack of logic in the definition of pregnancy as a
sex-related phenomenon, General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976), which might weaken
the chances of better occupational safety and health for pregnant women. See also Mathews v.
De Castro, 97 S. Ct. 431 (1976). Instead of sex-related claims, advocates for protection of
pregnant workers may find some relief through Department of Labor regulations allowing an
employee a right to refuse work when he or she feels a dangerous working condition exists. 29
C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1975). Federal district courts currently disagree over the validity of this
right. See [1976] 0CCUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 852-53.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1972). See also Goodman, "Protecting" Women, Wash. Post,
June 21, 1976, at A-23, col. 5.
33. For a much more detailed treatment, see Comment, The Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970: An Overview, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 477 (1974).
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new insight on the institutional weaknesses of NIOSH, which has never
emerged from the interstices of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare. 34 Ashford raises the point that, while NIOSH technicians conduct
workplace inspections to evaluate hazards, tliey have no authority to issue
citations for any violations they may find (p. 279). A lamentable need
continues for an investigation into the extent to which NIOSH personnel
inform OSHA of the existence of these hazards and the extent of action by
OSHA inspectors on the basis of those reports. Unfortunately, the Ford
Foundation study did not undertake the task.
The book's analysis of OSHA is disappointing because it conveys no
sense of the difficulties the Agency has encountered in developing standards
through the informal rulemaking procedure mandated by the Act35 and refined
by judicial review. 36 OSHA promulgated final standards limiting the exposure of employees to asbestos dust, vinyl chloride, and certain other carcinogens well before the completion of the manuscript of the book; 37 thus it should
have been apparent that the rulemaking process followed by the Agency had
become incredibly cumbersome, fraught with complexity, and vulnerable to
delay tactics by the parties. 38 The necessity for streamlining procedures has
not diminished in light of recent OSHA efforts to promulgate rules for noise39
and coke oven ernissions. 40 Legal issues, such as whether OSHA may
exercise subpoena power provided for in section 657(b) of the Ac~ 1 to gather
data needed for the development of standards, 42 lurk beneath the surface.
Crisis, however, makes no contribution to a resolution of these difficulties

34. For a discussion of the history of NIOSH (formerly known as either Bureau of
Occupational Safety and Health or BOSH) and its problems, see J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra
note 12, at 88-94; Page & Munsing, supra note 13, at 654-57.
35. 29 u.s.c. § 655 (1970).
36. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Associated Indus., Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Note,
Judicial Review Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act: The Substantial Evidence Test as
Applied to Informal Rulemaking, 1974 DuKE L.J. 459 (1974).
37. See 39 Fed. Reg. 3756 (1974) (carcinogens); 39 Fed. Reg. 35,890 (1974) (vinyl chloride);
37 Fed. Reg. 11,318 (1972) (asbestos dust).
38. OSHA has adopted a 22-step process, beginning with the development of a proposed
standard, followed by various internal reviews, five internal revisions, Federal Register publication of the proposed standard, two more reviews and revisions, and culminating in Federal
Register publication of the final standard. For a summary of the process, see Hearings on
Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations for 1976 Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., I st Sess., pt. 5, at 625-26 (1975).
For an account of the asbestos proceedings, seeP. BRODEUR, EXPENDABLE AMERICANS (1974).
For an account of the carcinogen proceedings, see Page & Munsing, supra note 13, at 657-65.
39. See 40 C.F.R. § 203 (1976) (occupational noise exposure). See also Mossberg, Hearings
on Tough Job-Noise Ceilings Start Today, and an Uproar Is Certain, Wall St. J.,June23, 1975, at
26, col. I.
40. See 41 Fed. Reg. 46,784 (1976) (coke oven emissions).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(b) (1970).
42. See note 29 supra.
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beyond a factual and somewhat critical description of the rulemaking procedure used to set carcinogen standards (pp. 154-59).
Further, the book fails to discuss adequately industry's objections to the
plethora of job safety rules. This drumfire of criticism falls upon the number
and complexity of safety standards,43 most of which were promulgated
without hearings in accord with section 655 of the Act, 44 and upon the
allegedly arbitrary enforcement of these rules by OSHA inspectors. 45 Although Ashford recognizes these problems, he does not address them in a
format that would contribute to the resolution of the continuing brouhaha. He
criticizes OSHA's compliance program, but suggests no more than increased
dedication and perseverance (pp. 253-60, 298-99).
The clean bill of health Ashford gives to the three-member OSHRCU' has
proved a faulty diagnosis. The removal of the OSHRC's first chairman under
cloudy circumstances47 and the subsequent filing of a suit by the ex-chairman
against his two colleagues48 suggest that the Commission is not functioning
well. This suspicion derives further support from the acrimonious relationships among the commissioners,49 the continuing uncertainties about the
structure and role of the Commission, 50 and the staggering backlog of pending
43. See note 6 supra; e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm 'n, 542 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1976) (corporation unsuccessful in appealing scaffolding standards
as vague).
44. 29 u.s.c. § 655(b)(3) (1970).
45. See note 1 supra.
46. ''On balance, the Commission maintains the degree of competence one would expect on
the basis of its high GS level" (p. 302).
47. See [1975) 0CCUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 347. Former OSHRC Chairman
Robert D. Moran claimed that he was removed from the chairmanship because he had complained to the White House about Labor Department involvement in the nomination of OSHRC
commissioners. See 5 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY LETTER 1 (Dec. 8, 1975). He has also
asserted that his policy of issuing press releases about cases that OSHA had lost before the
Commission angered the Labor Department and contributed to his dismissal as Chairman. See
Pike, Press Releases on Failures Helped Demote Chief ofHealth Unit, Wash. Star, Nov. 27, 1975,
at A-ll, col. I.
48. Moran v. Barnako, No. 75-1981 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 25, 1975). The suit alleged that the
other two commissioners were disposing of cases without notice to Moran. It was dismissed
when all three commissioners adopted a statement clarifying the Commission's decisional
procedures. See [1975) 0CCUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1019.
49. For example, Chairman Moran's publication of proposed Freedom of Information Act
regulations over the objections of his two colleagues drew a stinging comment from Commissioner Timothy F. Cleary. See [1975) 0CCUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1040-41. The
attitudes of the commissioners occasionally surface in their opinions. See, e.g., D. Federico Co.,
3 O.S.H.C. (BNA) 1970,1975 (OSHRC 1976)(Moran, C., dissenting): "Thelogicofthemajority
is such that if someone refers to a dog's tail as a leg, that particular dog would thereafter have five
legs. Come to think of it, a five-legged dog makes more sense than the Barnako-Oeary logic used
throughout the foregoing opinion." See also Francisco Tower Serv., Inc., 3 O.S.H.C. (BNA)
1952, 1961 (OSHRC 1976) (Moran, C., dissenting): "This kind of 'logic' could equally be used to
prove that Messrs. Barnako and Oeary are really justices of the United States Supreme Court or
members of the Holy Trinity."
50. For example, is the Commission a "court" exercising solely adjudicative functions or
does it also have the characteristics of an agency? See Moran, A Court in the Executive Branch of
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cases. 51 Although the OSHRC would benefit greatly from close scrutiny,
Crisis sheds no light on its problems.
Ashford recognizes the existence and importance of the political impact
of job-related health and safety regulation, but he approaches this delicate
area like a conscript entering a mine field. He includes at the beginning of the
Appendix the infamous Guenther memorandum, written in 1972 by the then
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health to describe
how OSHA might help in the campaign to reelect Richard Nixon by not
proposing any highly controversial standards and by exploiting "the great
potential of OSHA as a sales point for fund raising and general support by
employers" (pp. 543-44). Ashford merely deplores the memo as "a sad
commentary on the lack of government responsibility'' (p. 538) and treads no
further. The New York Times has reported that, at a time when in his
reelection campaign President Ford was criticizing OSHA for being too tough
on industry, OSHA postponed until after the 1976 elections the promulgation
of a number of important health standards. 5 2 Thus, the problem symbolized
by the Guenther memorandum has not disappeared and deserves careful
attention.
Congressional oversight provides a countervailing force that could offset
the political machinations of the executive branch. As with his executive
analysis, Ashford backs off and refuses to analyze the forces that interact on
Capitol Hill. Crisis offers no insights into the committees that control the
legislation concerning safety and health in the workplace, confirmations, and
appropriations, nor does it critique the performance of Congress since the
effective date of the Act. 53
Although Ashford's review of the performance of the public sector
falters at points, he redeems these shortcomings in his delineation of the limits
of applying economic analysis to governmental efforts to protect workers
from injury and disease. A weighing of costs and benefits is appropriate at
Government: The Strange Case of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 20
WAYNE L. REv. 999 (1974). See also Moran, Discretionary Review by the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission: Is it Necessary?, 46 CoLO. L. REv. 139 (1974) (Should the
current system, whereby OSHRC commissioners have discretion to call cases for review, be
replaced by a system limiting OSHRC review to cases in which affected parties petition
OSHRC?).
51. At the end of fiscal year 1975, there were 466 cases pending for review by the full
Commission. After the first six months of fiscal year 1976, that figure had increased to 621. See
1977 Appropriation Hearings, supra note 13, at 1347.
52. See Burnham, supra note 2.
53. For criticisms of aspects of congressional performance, see Burnham, Senator Criticizes
Job Safety Agency, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1974, at 37, col. I (report of discrepancy between
charges of OSHA harassment made by Sen. Peter H. Dominick, minority member of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and version of story told by businessman supposedly
harassed); J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 12, at 193 (criticism of Senate Labor and Public
Welfare Committee hearing on nomination of OSHRC commissioners).
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four points in the decisionmaking process: (1) the threshold determination of
whether any need for governmental intervention exists; (2) the delineation of
the general strategy any needed intervention should assume; (3) case-by-case
decision, in which governmental intervention takes such forms as the setting
and enforcing of mandatory standards; and (4) subsequent evaluations of the
effectiveness of governmental intervention. Ashford makes a major contribution by demonstrating that a cost-benefit approach in and of itself offers no
easy answers at any point in the process.
Governmental intervention through the workmen's compensation laws
and health and safety codes derives from the realization that "placing sole
reliance upon the unregulated free market leads to a socially unacceptable
level of workplace injury, illness, and death" (p. 311). Without intervention,
employers would not bear the costs of preventing or compensating for harms
caused by industrial accidents and diseases and therefore would permit the
financial burden to fall upon employees and the public. Economically, it is in
society's best interest to minimize the sum total of these costs. 54 Therefore,
within the framework of a free-enterprise system, government should intrude,
but only to the extent necessary to create economic incentives that will induce
industry to take measures to achieve the goal of cost minimization. Costbenefit analysis furnishes a tool for calculating the appropriate degree of
governmental intervention; the analysis has become very important to the
1970 Act, which the courts have interpreted to require consideration of costs
and benefits in the creation of health ~d safety standards. 55
Ashford launches a double-barreled attack on cost-benefit analysis as it
has been applied to occupational health and safety regulation. He points out
numerous market imperfections, including the interplay of nonmarket factors, that make it exceedingly difficult-if not impossible--to decide the
necessary level of governmental intervention on a cost-benefit basis. He then
raises the critical query whether the socially acceptable level of work hazards
should derive solely from economic considerations.
The list of market imperfections begins with the inadequacy of the data
base, an insurmountable obstacle to intelligent choice (pp. 335-38). A further
flaw is the inadequate dissemination given to available data (pp. 335-37).
These shortcomings become particularly acute in the area of occupational
health and can lead to an underestimation of the benefits of prevention as well

54. See G. CALABRESI, THE Cosrs OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970): "Apart from the requirements of
justice, I take it as axiomatic that the principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the
costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents."
55. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir.
1974). See also Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 130(5th Cir.
1974).
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as an overestimation of the costs of avoidance. Information obtained after the
introduction of a new manufacturing process or substance into the workplace
may be useless for regulatory purposes because of the constant innovation
characteristic of modem industry. The information gap is widened by a
divergence in time horizons, as a result of which initiatives for the prevention
of disease must begin long before its possible manifestation. Another divergence weakening the operation of market forces occurs when top management sets long-range corporate goals of accident and illness reduction, but
evaluates lower and middle management for promotion purposes on the
short-run basis of reduction in costs. These short-run cost reductions rarely
reflect consideration of the costs of preventing future job-related diseases.
Both the goal of reducing costs imposed by work hazards and the
collateral goal of minimizing the costs of prevention seek to avoid injuries and
illnesses worth avoiding and to permit the incurrence of those not worth
avoiding. As a necessary corollary to these goals, workers must be free to
judge the personal worth of the risk that society has deemed economically not
worth avoiding. Ashford argues that, in reality, workers do not have this
choice and points to a decrease in interfirm mobility and the psychic stresses
associated with loss of employment as chains that bind workers to hazardous
jobs. Nonmarket factors also nullify an employee's freedom to assume or
reject occupational risks. These include the social conditioning of workers to
accept job hazards and the irreversibility of certain diseases, which an
employee may have contracted long before he learns of his plight. ''A worker
can therefote come to have serious cause to regret an earlier decision
regarding the assumption of workplace risk, but at that point it may be too late
to move to a safe job" (p. 356).
Industry and government must take market imperfections into account to
obtain an accurate indication of the economic burdens that occupational
health and safety standards may justifiably impose. The imperfections render
unintelligible even an approximation of the costs and benefits of regulation by
government of workplace hazards. Ashford carries the problem one step
further by questioning the propriety of making such decisions in economic
terms alone. He asks us to consider who pays the costs and who reaps the
benefits (p. 330). Although the public may profit from toleration of a certain
level of work hazards, the actual burden of bearing them falls upon a specific
group of employees who may not have understood the health risk when they
began work and who may not have the ability to change jobs once they
discover the risk and desire to avoid it. The selection of workers to endure
workplace pollution is nonrandom, Ashford argues (pp. 85-88). They do not
comprise a representative sample of the general public, but instead remain
concentrated in certain particularly hazardous occupations. Therefore, it is
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inequitable to ask them to bear the entire risk so that the entire population may
enjoy the fruits of modem technology, even though a cost-benefit analysis
may conclude that the risk is economically justifiable. How much weight to
accord the "justice factor" (pp. 359-63) may vary according to the values of
the person making the judgment. Ashford makes the important point that
society ought to pay heed to this consideration in deciding how much
occupational health and safety regulation government should impose.
Implicit in Ashford's underscoring the limitations of cost-benefit
analysis is the dilemma OSHA must confront whenever it sets standards. The
agency must consider the economic feasibility of a proposed standard, a
requirement recognized by the courts. 56 Moreover, the requirement has
become more onerous as a result of a recent executive order mandating the
preparation of inflation impact statements by executive agencies that undertake major regulatory activities. 57 Because accurate measurement of costs and
benefits must reflect market imperfections, the complexity may so confound
the rule making process that it becomes unworkable. OSHA may not have the
resources to gather and analyze the necessary data; 58 thus occasions for delay
in the promulgation of final standards may multiply. At the same time, the
substantial and constantly increasing number of toxic substances in the
workplace imposes burgeoning pressures on OSHA to increase its pace of
setting standards. In the midst of these travails, the agency has received
virtually no help from Congress, which has never expended the time or effort
to consider carefully the economic element in occupational health and safety
regulation.
Crisis in the Workplace does not offer any solutions, but by pointing out
the extent of the problem in terms of economic goals and methods, it performs
a service of inestimable value. The shortcomings of the book stem in large
part from the high standards against which an opus of this magnitude deserves
to be measured. Its merits should attract close scrutiny on the part of
individuals and groups in the private and public sectors concerned with
reducing the toll of work-related accidents and diseases.
56. See cases cited note 55 supra.
57. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3A C.F.R. 203 (Supp. 1974). A labor union has challenged the
legality of this order as applied to OSHA. Oil, Chern. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Usery,
Civ. No. 76,365 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 3, 1976).
58. The academic backgrounds of the 33-person staff of OSHA's Division of Health
Standards Development revealed a solitary degree (B.A.) in economics. See 1977Appropriation
Hearings, supra note 13, at 568-69 (1976).
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